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RESTRICTIONS ON LOBBYING ACTIVITIES
BY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REMEI)IES
James A. Moore °
"
Barbara J. Washburn
Eugene Goldman* **
The Internal Revenue Code places restrictions on the extent to which tax exempt
charitable orgamizations may act to influence legislative policy development. The Code
requires that "no substantial part of the activities" of a charitable organization may
consist of "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation. I
Although this substantial activity test has been in effect for approximately forty years,
" neither the courts nor the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been able to derive a
universally acceptable definition of "substantial." Thus. charitable organizations
which engage in influencing legislation are at the mercy of subjective determinations
which may threaten their favored tax status. ,
During 1975 a majority of the House Committee on Ways and Means, led by
Representative Barber B. Conable (R-N.Y.), and nearly half of the Senate. led by
Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me.), introduced identical bills I which would
moderately expand and define more clearly the extent to which public charities may
participate in the legislative process.
This article will explore the present limitations on legislative activities of
charitable organizations. It will also discuss the countervailing considerations which
favor eliminating the vagueness of existing lobbying restrictions and partially redressing
the inequality with business organizations which may claim tax deductions for
lobbying expenses. Special emphasis will be placed on legislative proposals which are
intended to remove the uncertainty of present law.
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1.Int.Rev. Code of 1954. Sect. 501.
2. Congress enacted this test in the Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, Sect. 23(o). 48 Star. 690. The languagtof the 1934
"substantial" test is identical to the language contained in the present section 501(c)(3).
3. For the purpose of this article. "charitable organization" or "501(c)(3) organization" will refer to organizations
qualifying for tax exemption umder section 501(c)(3). The term will not include private foundations which are
subject, under section 4945 of the Code. to more severe limitations on their legislative activities. S& Int. Rev. Code of
1954, Sect. 4945. It also does not include organizations qualified under Sect. 501(c(4), infra. note 4.
4. "Favored tax status" refers to a public charity's exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Code and the ability of its
7
contributors to deduct their charitable contributions under sections 1 0(c)(2) (income tax deduction), 2055(a)
(charitable bequest deductions), and 2522(a) (gift tax deduction). Contributors tomany other organizations exempt
under section 501. such as civic leagues under section 501(c)(4), are not permitted to deduct their contributions, but
the Code does not restrict Sect. 501(c)(4) organizations from engaging substantially in legislative activities. SeeInt.
Rev. Code of 1954. Sect. 501(c)(4).
Historically, the favored tax status is justified on the ground that the charity relieves financial burdens that would
Report cfthe Committee on Vas and Means. H. Rept. No. 1860. 75th Cong., 3d
otherwise fall on the government. See:
Sess. (1938).
5. H.R. 8021, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.(1975) and S.2832. 94th Cong.. Ist Sess.,introduced June 18,1975. and December
19 (legislative day, December 15), 1975, respectively.

THE "SUBSTANTIAL" TEST
Public charities desiring to participate in the legislative process have few standards
to guide them for meeting the "substantial" test. Neither the Internal Revenue Code
nor its Regulations define the term "substantial." Instead, the Regulations use the term
to define itself, saying that an organization to be exempt may not "devote more than
an insubstantial part of its activities" to influencing legislation. " In fact, it is the policy
of the IRS not to define the term clearly. "
The reported cases do not clarify what is meant by "substantial" activity either,
although the present provision was first enacted in 1934. Rather, the courts have
considered each case in an ad hoc fashion and have used various criteria to test
"substantiality." Such criteria have included a percentage test based on the total
amount of funds expended on lobbying activities, , examinations of the beneficial
effects of the organization's legislative activity to the community, 9 the time and effort
expended by unpaid volunteers in formulating legislative positions for the organization, 10and the degree of relationship between the lobbying activities and the objectives
and circumstances of the charity. II
In Martha Hubbard Davis, the Court used a "very small part" test in holding that
the organization in question had not violated the "substantial" provision of section
501(c)(3), stating that the legislative activities constituted a "very small part" of the
general activity of the organization. The Court stated further that such activities were
"purely incident to its main and controlling purpose and activity" which was entirely
charitable and educational. The Court apparently considered several factors in reaching
its decision, such as the portion of legislative activity in relation to the organization's
general activity, and whether such activities were merely incidental to the organization's
primary purpose and activity.
The Sixth Circuit appears to be the only court which has attempted to provide a
formula to determine the meaning of "substantial." In Seasongood v. Commissioner 13the
court held that the devotion of less than 5% of a non-partisan, good-government
league's time and effort to legislative activity was not "substantial." In Christian Echoes
National Ministry v. United States , 14 the court rejected the percentage test of Seasongood
, stating, "A percentage test to determine whether the activities were substantial
obscures the complexity of balancing the organization's activities in relation to its
objectives and circumstances." The court then denied section 501(c)(3) status to the
organization, finding that its legislative activities were "an essential part" of its
program and that such legislative activities were not "incidental, but were substantial
6. Regs. Sect. 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(3)(i).
7.SeeInternal Revenue Service, Exempt Organization Handbook (MT(11 I u71-56, paragraph 764 April 19. 1972). The
handbook states that substantiality is frequently "self-evident" with no simple rulefor determining a violation of the
"substantial" test. Id.
8. See,
e.g., Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955), rev'g 22 T.C. 671.
9. See,e.g., Dulles
v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 367 (2d Cir.1959). cert. denied,
364 U.S. 834 (1960); Roberts Dairy Co. v.
Commissioner, 195 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952). St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.United States,
374 F.2d 427, 435-36 (8th Cit. 1967) (dictum).
10. See,e.g.,fuper v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964). League of Women Voten v.
United States, 180 F. Supp. 379 (Cc. Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960)11.

See,e.g., Haswel v. United States. 500 F. 2d 1133. 1142-43 (Cr. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975). Christiam

Echoes Nat'/ Ministry v. United S'ates, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cit. 1972), cert. denied, 14 U.S. 864 (1973).
12. 22 T.C. 1091 (1954), acq. 1954-2 C.B.4.
13. Supra, note 8.
14. Supra, note 11. The IRS also rejects the Seasongood percentage test. '"There is no simple rule as to what amount of
activities is substantial ...The Seasongood Case ...provides but limited guidance because the court's view as to
what sort of activities were to be measured is no longer supported by the weight of precedent ...In addition, it is
not clear how the five percent was arrived at." Internal Revenue Service, Exempt Organization Handbook (MT(I 1)
671-56 paragraph 764(1) April 19. 1972).

and continuous." 1
In League of Women Voters v. United States , 1 the court refused to consider only
the number of hours spent on direct lobbying, but included the time and effort spent
at the chapter level in formulating and discussing positions to be taken by the League
on various proposals. The court, in denying section 501(c)(3) status to the League,
stated that the influencing of legislation was the League's "main purpose and reason
for being."
in 1974, the Court of Claims in Haswell v. United States I"followed the holding in
Christian Echoes by rejecting the percentage test as the primary means of determining
substantiality. In disqualifying the organization as a charity capable of receiving tax
deductible contributions under section 170(c)(2), the court balanced the political
activities of the organization against its objectives and circumstances and found the
organization had engaged in substantial legislative activity. While the court stated that
the percentage test was inappropriate because it clouded the balancing test, it applied an
expenditure test based on overhead costs and salaries to justify its finding of
substantiality. ,8 In effect the court simultaneously applied the percentage and
balancing tests in finding a violation of the substantial test.
It is readily apparent that the cases offer no clear guidelines as to what constitutes
"substantial" activity for purposes of section 501(c)(3). The present state of the law is
perhaps best summarized by the Tax Court in Martha Hubbard Davis :
The question is always one offact to be determined upon the recordof purely
charitableactivities and activities influencing legislation and a comparison of the
two. Under such conditions the decisions of the courts in other cases are of little
value. '9

THE NEED FOR CORRECTIVE LEGISLATION
The Code's vagueness on permissible lobbying has understandably chilled the
desire of charitable organizations to engage in the legislative process. The severe penal.ty
of losing favored tax status for violating the undefined "substantial" test suggests the
possibility that the vagueness of the restriction interferes with the first amendment
right of free expression 20 and is an improper exercise of legislative sanctions. 21
Those charities who participate in the legislative area risk expensive and timeconsuming audits to determine whether they have met undefined standards. The
Service has at times attempted to view the term "substantial," not only in undefined
quantitative terms, but in undefined qualitative terms as well. A "facts and
circumstances" test, apparently called for by the Regulations, takes the bewildered
charities out of definable areas, such as specific financial expenditures and allocations of
staff time, and into completely uncharted areas, including not only time of volunteers,
but importance of the effort, and very possibly other factors. 22
is. Supra, note II at p. 856.
16. Su/ra, note 10.
Supra , note 11.
Supra, note 11,at p. 1142-47.
Supra. note 12, at p. 1099.
31
Legislation,
on Influencing
of the Restrictions
The Validity
Law-Making, and theConstitution:
Troyer, Charitie,
N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Taxation 1415, 1456 (Pt. 2 1973); Note, The First Amendment Oserbreadth Doctrine. 83 Harv. L
Rev. 344 (1970).
21. Support forthe proposition that a vague and uncertain standard is inappropriate where the penalty forviolation of
the standard is loss of exemption is found in the legislative history of section 4942 of the Code. Previously vague
standards were made more defi=it, and the penalties were changed. See Treasury Department Reoort on Private
Foundations 25 (Feb. 2, 1965); House Committee on Ways and Means H. R. Rep. No. 413, Pt. I 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 25 (1969); Senate Finance Committee S. Rep. No. 552. 91st Cong., 1st Seas. (1969).
22, As Mortimer Caplin, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue, pointed out in his testimony before the Committee
on Ways and Means, revenue agents are normally experts on accounting, not ideology, and it is almost impossible to
tell what one of them would decide on a given set of facts. Inconsistent enforcement of the law by the Internal
17.
18.
19,
20.

20

When a charity's exemption is revoked, no matter how tenuous the grounds, it
takes a considerable period of time to get the action reversed, whether by administrative
or court action. 11 During this period, the charity cannot assure contributors that their
contributions will be deductible, and the normal programs of the charity inevitably
suffer drastically. 24 In many instances, loss of contributions will result in total and
permanent cessation of the organization's charitable activities.
The significant questions of policy and equity which arise from the charge that a
chilling effect is created by section 501(c)(3) are compounded by the disparate statutory
treatment afforded businesses which engage in lobbying activities. In 1962 Congress
enacted section 162(e) granting to business entities the right to deduct as ordinary and
necessary expenses amounts paid or incurred in connection with legislative activity of
direct interest to the business including, specifically, that portion of the dues paid to
any trade association of which the business is a member which is attributable to such
legislative activity. 2sThese trade associations are frequently classified as tax-exempt,
under section 501(c)(6), thus compounding the inequity.
The legislative history of section 162(e) suggests that Congress felt it desirable
governmental policy to have available information concerning the impact pending
legislation would have on American businesses. The relevant Senate Report expresses
this policy:
It is also desirable that the taxpayers who have information bearing on the
impact of present laws or proposed legislation on their trade or business not
be discouraged in making the information available to the members of
Congress or legislators in other levels of Government. The presentation of
such information to the legislators is necessary to a proper evaluation on
their part of the impact of prior proposed legislation. 21
The inequity of present law is reflected in the remarks of Senator Muskie made in
1971 in support of S. 1408, a bill permitting charities to engage in direct lobbying
acti vi ties:
It is fundamental to our constitutional system that they should have equal
access along with business groups and others in presenting views to
Congress. This is so, not because the views of the public interest groups are
necessarily correct, but because in considering the increasingly complex
matters which come before it, the Congress should hear and weigh all views
to the fullest extent possible.
Revenue Service would naturally follow. Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 1.720 to Amend
T)pes of EX-empt Orgamizations 40, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.(1972);
the Internal Revenue Code with Respect to Certain
hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 13720.
23. Under present law an organization laced with loss of its 501(c)(3) status cannot obtain immediate judicial review of
an adverse determination by the Service. It must go through the normal judicial process. Section 1202 of H.R.
10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.. (1975), passed by the House of Representatives and pending in the Senate Finance
Committee as this article goes to press, undertakes to solve this problem by providing a procedure for a charity to
seek declaratory judgment in the Tax Court or United States district courtasto its tax-exempt status. While the case
is pending, contributions up to$1000 would still be deductible.
24. When the I RS proposed in 1967 that the Sierra Club's favored tax status be revoked because of the Club's political
activity, the Club estimated thatthe proposed revocation costitS125.000 in contributions. Note The Sierra Club.
Political Activitr. and Tax Exempt Charttab"e .Vtau. 5 Geo. L.J. 1129 n.5,6 (1969).
25. The enactment of Sect. 162(e) superseded Supreme Court holdings that expenditures in furtherance of an attempt to
promote or defeat legislation before a legislative body were not deductible, notwirhs-anding the direct relationship
to the taxpayer's tradeor business. It had been the Court's purpose t maintain a uniform prohibition against
indirect subsidization of the legislative activities of private parties. See Commarano v. United State. 358 U.S. 498
(1959); Textile Aill Sec.Corp. v.Commissioner. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
26. S.Rep. No.1881, 87th Cong.. 2d Sess.22 (1962)
(1971), 117Cong. Rec. 8517 (1971).
27. 92nd Cong., 1stSess.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR CLARIFYING
THE SUBSTANTIAL TEST
Impetus for corrective legislative efforts may be attributed, in part, to a 1969
American Bar Association resolution which called upon Congress to restore the balance
in legislative influence between public charities and the business community by
permitting such charities to engage in substantial direct legislative activity with respect
to matters of direct interest to them. "I In 1969, an amendment was introduced by
Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to redress the imbalance between sections
162(e) and 501(c)(3). 29The amendment was never called up for final consideration by
the Senate Finance Committee.
In 1971, legislation based on the ABA resolution was introduced by Senator
Muskie 30 in the Senate and Congressman James W. Symington (D-Mo.) in the House.
31 The bills followed the characteristics of section 162(e), permitting business
deductions for lobbying.
Although there was broad support for the- Muskie-Symington bill, concern was
expressed that the bill "might be interpreted to permit a public charity to devote its
predominant activities to legislative efforts. 32 As a result, Senators Muskie and Hugh
Scott (R-Pa.) introduced a new bill on January 24, 1972, which was identical to the
Muskie-Symington bill except for one additional limitation: The organization must be
one that "normally" devotes "substantially more than one-half" of its expenditures in
pursuance of its exempt functions other than lobbying. 3
Discussion on the Muskie-Scott bill led to further compromise and considerable
refinement which culminated in the introduction on March 9, 1972, of a bill by
Congressmen Al Ullman (D-Oreg.) and Herman Schneebeli (R-Pa.). 34 The measure
would have permitted charities to devote 20 percent of their expenditures to lobbying
activities. No more than one-quarter of this 20 percent could be devoted to grass roots
lobbying. Communication of information regarding legislation between an organiz.ation and its membership would be included in the direct lobbying expenditure
limitation.
The bill further provided that making available the results of non-partisan
analysis, study, research, providing technical advice or assistance to a governmental
body in response to a written request, or appearances before legislative bodies with
respect to decisions that could affect an organization's existence or status were not to -be
considered "attempts to influence legislation."" Every subsequent bill proposing
amendment of Section 501 has contained similar exclusions.
28. The ABA resolution is reprinted and discussed in Section o] taxation. Counsel and Committee Recommendations. 21 Tax
Lawyer 967-72 (1968). The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (known as The Filer
Commission) recommended a similar change in lobbying restrictions to permit charities to engage without limit in
Philanthropy and
rho e activities that are deductible when done by businesses. Report of tI&Commmuioa =s Private
Commission, made up of
Public Needs, Giving in America: Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector 181 (1975). The Filer
approximately 30 prominent people and funded through private sources, studied a broad range of issues in the area
of private philanthropy for more than two years. The recommendations, designed to expand and reinforce the base of
private philanthropy, were presented in late 1975 to the Secretary of the Treasury and the chairmen of the House
Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. See also H.R. 9256. 94th Cong.. 1st Sess.(1975).
29. Amendment No. 224 toH.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.(1969).
(1971).
30. S.1408, 92d Cong., 1stSess.
31. H.R. 8920, 92d Cong., 1stSess.
(1971).
32. Remarks of Senator Muskie, 118 Cong. Rec. 843 (1972).
33. S.3063, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.(1972). Senator Muskie noted that the "substantially more than one-half" provision of
S. 3063 was comparable to the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 which interpreted "substantially more than
and "normally" as requiring, generally, reference to a four-ycar period of an organization's
one-half" as 65 percent
experience. 118 Cong. Rec. 843 (1972).
34. H.R. 13720. 92nd Cong.. 2d Sess.
(1972).
tothe legislative
activities
of private foundations.
35. These exceptions aremodeled after
Sect.
4945(e) which pertains
SeeInt.
Rev. Code of 1954 Sect.
4945(e).

The House Committee on Ways and Means held hearings on the UllmanSchneebeli bill on May 3-5, 1972. Testimony showed strong support for the basic
principles of the bill, but questions were raised about specific provisions, particularly by
representatives of the Treasury Department. 36 In response to these questions and others
raised during further study by all parties, Congressmen Ullman and Schneebeli
introduced a new bill on March 1, 1973. 3- On December 19, 1973, Congressman
Conable introduced another bill, 38 further reflecting the on-going efforts at communication and compromise. The Ways and Means Committee tentatively adopted the
Conable bill with the addition of several provisions. However, the tax reform package
drafted for final action by the Committee departed from this bill in several respects.
These changes appeared sufficiently far-reaching that it was impossible to arrive at an
acceptable draft to include in the final tax reform package approved, under much time
pressure, by the Committee. Therefore, Congressman Conable, after consultation with
representatives of charitable organizations, asked that the bill be withdrawn.
Congressman Conable and Senator Muskie have once again in the 94th Congress
introduced corrective legislation, 39building on the compromises of the past. As of this
writing the bills are being further revised by the staff of the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation in cooperation with the Treasury Department and the
Coalition of Concerned Charities. 40 It is expected that new bills will be introduced in
both houses in the near future.
These bills with the anticipated changes adhere to the fundamental principles but
undertake to resolve the four major problems raised over the years. First, a percentage
expenditure limitation could conceivably make possible the accumulation of immense
funds available for lobbying. 42 Second, absent separate restrictions, charities could
allocate their allowable limits to "grass roots" lobbying. 42 Third, communications with
its members is the lifeblood of any charity, 43 so an exclusion for this is essential.
However, if no restriction is placed on such communications, the fear has been
expressed that "membership" could be expanded (by a charity seeking to abuse the
privilege) to include gigantic mailing lists, which could lead to a type of grass roots
lobbying; in addition, even communications with bona fide members should, under
certain circumstances, be considered as equivalent to other types of efforts to influence
legislation. Fourth, an organization losing its 501(c)(3) status because of lobbying
activities could have a large endowment fund, created with tax deductible dollars, that
could then be expended without limitation on lobbying activities.
To solve the first problem, the Muskie-Conable bills incorporate the reverse
graduation percentage used in prior bills. The numbers, however, differ from those of
36. Seestatement of Honorable Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for Fax Policy. Department of the Treasury.
Hearings on H.R. 13720 5-10.
37. H.R. 5095, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
38. H.R. 12037, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
39. Supra, note 5.
40. The Coalition of Concerned Charities is a group of over 80 501(c)(3) organizations from the health, education,
environment, and social service fields formed in 1973 to work for passage of legislation clarifying and expanding the
rights of 501(c)(3) organizations to lobby.
41. Statement of Honorable Edwin S. Cohen, these Playtex Sryles:supra , note 36, at p. 8-9.
42. The term "grass roots" lobbying is used in this article to refer to the influencing of the general public with respect
to legislative matters.
43. Statement of Dr. Elvis J. Stahr, Chairman, Coalition of Concerned Charities, Hearings Before the Committee on
Ways and Means on the Subject of General Tax Reform , 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1483 (1973):
"it seems to me, that in restricting the right of an organization to communicate with and within its own
membership, one is striking at the very heart of a public charity by cutting the flow of information between a
national staff and its constituent members around the country.
This runs the risk of detaching the staff from the very people that provide the resources with which the
organization pursues its purposes."

23

earlier bills. A charity's lobbying expenditures would be limited as follows: 20 percent
of the first $500,000 of a charity's total expenditures; 15 percent of the next $500,000;
10 percent of the next $500,000; and 5 percent of the excess over $1,500,000. An
overall spending limitation of $1,000,000 for lobbying would be applied. 44
The proposed revised bill would penalize a charity exceeding its limitations in the
first instances without the severe sanction of loss of exemption by imposing a tax on
excess expenditures of 25 percent of all amounts over the limitation. Not until a
charity "normally" 41 spent in excess of 150 percent of its limitations would it lose its
501 (c) (3) status, To avoid the problem of the transfer of a large endowment fund upon
such loss of 501(c)(3) status because of lobbying, the proposed revised bill would
provide that the charity could not become a 501(c)(4) organization 4" and could not
distribute its assets to another (c)(3) or (c)(4) organization. The grass roots and
membership communication concerns are also addressed in the proposed revised bill.
Grass roots expenditures would be limited to 25 percent of the permissible limit for all
lobbying. The 25 percent tax would be levied if the grass roots ceiling were exceeded
even though the overall lobbying ceiling had not been reached. 4- Communications
between an organization and its bona fide members ("bona fide" to be defined by
Regulations) would be excluded from the definition of "influencing legislation"
except when the communication "directly encouraged" the member to influence
legislation. A communication urging a member to request others to participate in the
lobbyin2 effort would be considered grass roots lobbying. By contrast, the bill already
introduced excludes all communications with members from the lobbying limitation
and contains no separate limitation on grass roots lobbying. 48
Both the existing and revised bills would eliminate the substantial test only for
those organizations electing to come under the bill. Thus, the legislation does not
replace the provisions of section 501(c)(3) but merely supplements them for electing
organizations. The bill makes it clear that non-electing charities are unaffected by its
provisions. One reason given for the election is that compliance with the expenditurebased test would require more frequent and comprehensive audits for some organizations than are required under existing law and that some of the organizations would
therefore prefer to remain under the substantial activity test. The election provision also
responds to concerns expressed by representatives of some church organizations that the
expenditure-based test would violate the First Amendment through "excessive
government en~anglement." 49
44. For example, a charity with a budget of $750,000 could spend $137,000 for lobbying; one with a budget of
$5,000,000 could spend $400,000. All charities with budgets in excess of $17,000,000 would be limited to $1,000,000
for lobbying expenditures.
To avoid circumvntion of the expenditure limtations, the bills would require "affiliated" organizations to combine
their budgets for purposes of the limitations. In the proposed bill organizations would be affiliated if Organization
by-laws provided that one organization would be required to follow anothe: organization's policies on legislative
issues, if the board of one was constituted with a majority of representatives from the other organization, or if the
boards of the two organizations were interlocking with a majority of the individuals on each board the same.
45. In discussions during the drafting of the bill, "normally" has been referred to asan averaging over a four year period,
similar to that used in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, see supra , note 33.
46. See supra , note 4.
47. If an organization's lobbying limit were $137,500 it could spend $34,375 on grass roots lobbying. If it spent $40,000
on grass roots, it would be taxed $1,406. Not until it averaged expenditures in excess of $206,250 for all lobbying
$34.375 limit) would it lose its
(150%of its $137,500 over-all lit) or $51,563 for grass roots lobbying (150% of its
501(c)(3) status because of subtantial lobbying activities.
48. Both bills are similar in excluding dissemination of nonpartisan studies, provision of technical advice and "selfdefense" of one's tax status. See supra, note 35.The existing bill would also exclude from the definition of
"influencing legislation" communications with the executive branch. The proposed bill would exclude such
cummunications except where the "principal purpose" is influencing legislation.
The Constitution precludes "sustained and detailed administrative relationships for the enforcement of statutory or
i...
administrative standards. .. (T)here must not be an excessive government entanglement with religion." Walz v.Tax
..omm'r, 397 U.S 664, 666 (1970). See statement of The Most Rev. Joseph L. Bernadin, Hearings on H.R. 13720
309.

CONCLUSION
The objective of the Conable-Muskie bills is not to permit charitable organizations to engage in full-time lobbying but to offer them clear and reasonable guidelines
which would permit a moderate expansion of their legislative activity. Absent such
corrective legislation charities will remain subject to case-by-case determinations from
the Internal Revenue Service and the courts without adequate guidelines to assist them
and legislatures will continue to feel the effects of the tax law's bias in favor of business
lobbying. The corrective legislation does not attempt wholly to eliminate this
imbalance, but does provide reasonabh' definite guidelines so that charities can
participate in the legislative process -- a tool often needed to carry out their primary
mission effectively.

Rev. Bernadin also has argued that an IRS determination on whether the examined activities of a religious 501
(c)(3) organization exceeded lobbying limitations would require the government to attach labels to at activity
which it considered "religious" and that activity which it considered -legislative". Such an interpretation of religious
activities would have a potential for restricting religious activities which might be considered political in nature by
the IRS. Similar determinations with a potential for entanglement between church and state have been opposed on
first amendment grounds. See Statement of William Thompson, Member, General Board. National Council of
Churches of Christ, Hearings on H.R. 13720 194, 199. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (statute
authorizing state officials to supplement the salaries of teachers with secular subjects in religious schools
constitutional under the first amendment, as the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the
statute involves excessive enmnaglement between government and religion): Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church.
393 U.S. 440 (1969) (civil courts cannot, consistent with the first amendment, determine ecclesiastical questions in
resolving property disputes).
The constitutionality of the "substantial" limitation as applied to religious groups was answered in the affirmative by
the Tenth Circuit, the only Circuit to reach the question. Christian Echoes supra. note II. at 856-857.

